

# Review Report ICM Rendsburg

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Final

Version 1.2



## Change History

Version	Author	Reviewed by	Change	Date
1.0	SN		Frist Draft	29.01.2020
1.1	SN	ICM Workshop	Map added, further changes discussed in Workshop	19.02.2020
1.2	SN	PIM	Add Simulation Date	09.03.2020

## Introduction

On 08.05.2019 happened a level crossing accident near Rendsburg (Alt-Duvenstedt) with the first application of the ICM routine on ScanMed RFC. To mitigate the influence of such international disturbances, the handbook for International Contingency Management was endorsed by RNE General Assembly and all Infrastructure Managers (IMs) to incorporate ICM process descriptions in their national incident framework. The following review reports collected the feedback of the concerned Managers and Experts which participated at this ICM Rendsburg case.

It was agreed on such report, especially because an advisory report was foreseen for the ICM simulation which is now transformed to a real case assessment, to derive lessons learned, findings and potential activities and recommendations.


These people have been involved in the assessment:

- Incident Managers at Operational Center
- Communication Managers
- OPE WG Experts
- Management Board
- PIM
- ScanMed Team
- (WG CRM)

The Feedback was collected in written form by each PIM for her/his IM and forwarded to the C-OSS Manager which steered the ICM review report.

## 1. Chronologic process of the ICM situation

**08.05.2019, 10:16:** DB Netz officially informs the corridor that an accident happened on a Railway crossing between Hamburg and Padborg (section Rendsburg – Owschlag) including a train derailment. They informed that since 04:37 the line Neumünster - Flensburg between Owschlag and Rendsburg is closed. A local train collided with a truck on level crossing in km 120.633 and derailed. Loco driver and truck driver seriously injured, several passengers slightly injured. Overhead line switched off in the above area since 04:51. The closure will last until 09.05.2019, 12:00 o'clock.



**08.05.2019, 16:00:** DB Netz organizes a national RU conference to inform affected German customers about the accident and next steps.

**08.05.2019, 17:08:** DB Netz informs in addition to previous notification with more details that the overhead line has been damaged at 300m. Due to this accident 40 trains have been already parked and the deviation time was to be expected to last round about 45 minutes in addition to the planned timetable. With a significant effect on international freight traffic at this moment (only 40% capacity was still available), DB Netz activated the ICM routine.

**08.05.2019, 18:06:** Managing Director Emanuele Mastrondonato (EM) asks “Zentraler Arbeitsstab DB-Netz” for a re-confirmation that an ICM case was declared.

**08.05.2019, 19:14:** After receiving the re-confirmation EM spreads the information of the ICM declaration to the pre-defined mailing list of communication and incident managers and to the MB, PIMs, Team and further stakeholders with attached documents. He invites to the first ICM telco on 09.05.2019, 10:00 with the incident managers and on 11:00 with the communication managers.

**09.05.2019, 2:43:** BZ-Info with update of the current situation and the changed forecast of the end of the disruption. DB Netzs expects that the disruptions will be fixed until 13.05.2019, 04:00

09.05.2019, 09:48: Reminder mail by EM to highlight the telco appointment at 10:00 and 11:00 to corresponding recipients

09.05.2019, 10:00/11:00: Telco of incident managers and communication managers

09.05.2019, 13:10: DB Netz communication manager Claudia Münchow circulates German and English press release for publication on ScanMed's webpage

09.05.2019, 13:25: EM circulates telco agenda, minutes and list of participants. Everyone is asked to check the document and is invited to the joint second telco on 10.05.2019, 10:00.

09.05.2019, 18:26: Updated documents of first Telco are shared with participants

10.05.2019, 10:00: Second telco as joint telco of incident and communication managers. The participants decide not to do a third telco, but a written update process for 13.05.2019 before 12:00

10.05.2019, 14:27: DB Netz updates incident information and shares it with participating IMs

10.05.2019, 17:57: EM circulates telco agenda, minutes and list of participants of second telco.

13.05.2019, 11:22: DB Netz sends written update of the international disturbance with the info that the operating concept is stable, and that the situation is relaxed due to low traffic on Monday morning. Forecast of line recommission is changed to 15.05., 18:00.

15.05.2019, 17:11: BZ informs that disturbance has been finished

15.05.2019, 17:20: DB Netz informs involved ICM participants that since 4.45 pm both tracks on the line between Flensburg and Hamburg are available again. So, all trains can run again without any problems.

16.05.2019, 12:17: Closure of ICM routine by EM

## 2. Result – overall impression

Summary of the collected feedback by DB Netz, RFI, TRV and BDK

- As first real event, the impression is Positive. However, it should be used Videocall instead of call conference.
- Overall, the information and structure of the meeting was good. Our national incident manager got all necessary information to handle the continued work nationally. Something to think about in the future when we have telco conferences:
  - Participants have different skills in English
  - Don't talk too fast and one at a time (often in telco meeting with a lot of participants it could be some background noise)
  - They who don't talk could perhaps mute their microphone
- We received a telephone call from Germany in relation to the immediate situation. We had regular contact regarding the developing situation/prognoses. Germany arranged several telephone conferences with several countries and kept everybody informed about when tracks could be expected to be opened. In this way, we could keep freight trains in Sweden until one track was opened and we could again run parts of the traffic towards

Germany. We could communicate stop of trains with the Railway Undertakings. Passenger trains to Hamburg was re-routed in Germany.

- There was a good flow of communication between national traffic control centres and we were provided with all the necessary information.

### 3. Results of the roles

Summary of the collected feedback by DB Netz, RFI, TRV and BDK

#### 3.1. Coordination ScanMed RFC

- The Handbook foresees separate TelCos for Operation Centres and Communication experts. The RFC acted accordingly on the first day, however it was realized that the group of participants mostly overlapped, and this approach is very time consuming. On the second day only one Telco was held for both Operation Centres and Communication Experts.
- Positive for fast reaction.

#### 3.2. Incident Manager leading IM

- The accident happened at 4.30am and the ICM case was announced by DB Netz in the afternoon when the consequences of the accident were clear and when the prognosis allowed it to categorize the case as an ICM disruption case. Good communication between DB Netz and RFC. The first Telco was scheduled for the next morning 10am. Hence it took 29 hours from the accident to the first Telco.
- DB Netz received its role as the leading Incident Manager, English-speaking staff was available.
- Positive for good description and detailed regarding the accident and time to restore.

#### 3.3. Incident Managers other IMs

- Not all IMs were joining the TelCos on time and sometimes not at all. It took very long to call people and ask them to join the Telco, those who have already dialled in had to wait. The geographical impact of the accident was mainly limited to the northern part of the corridor.
- Positive for cooperation

#### 3.4. Communication manger leading IM

- Information at the beginning was only provided in German without any focus on Rail freight traffic.
- Positive for good description and detailed regarding the accident and time to restore.

#### 3.5. Communication manger other IMs

- No Feedback
- Our communication manager thought the meetings was valuable and gave a good picture of the accident. He also pointed out it should only be one meeting and not separated in two.
- It was also good to hear how the country of accident communicated the accident so it will be communicated in the same way in the others.

## 4. Result of the processes

Summary of the collected feedback by DB Netz, RFI, TRV and BDK

### 4.1. Disruption Management Process

- On Friday it was uncertain how we would proceed the next week, it was not clear if there is another Telco.
- Overall positive.
- Most of the participants were very positive both in content and in implementation of the meetings. What became very important was that it gave an increased focus on freight transport flows and the need to coordinate this between the countries. The dialogue with the customers should continue to be national but could be strengthened by the fact that customers at a higher-level ought to participate the coordination meetings that the Corridors hold. Next step the customers have to prepare their contingency plans in order to use the diverting routes that we have pointed out and to speed up the process. Together with customers and terminals, we ought to create a common process for international disruption management.

### 4.2. Communication Management Process

- Overall positive.
- Proposal that the communicators take part in the disruption process otherwise it feels like duplication of the work and TelCos for some participants. Most of the information is the same anyway.

## 5. Analysis and Findings

Following Take-aways have been identified:

- Familiarity of the RFC ICM Coordinator and Deputy with the ICM Managers in the list (ICM RFC3 Re-routing documents) is essential, RFC Team support needed.
- Pre-check of ICM Managers availability for the TelCo and check the functioning of the TelCo equipment is recommended.
- Quick follow up of the Incident Managers is essential, filling the Minutes in, and sharing detailed information. Not always possible to share the screen, precise written information is needed right after the TelCo.
- Keep the TelCo communication as leaner as possible, avoiding any delay and loss of attention. Remind TelCo rules when inviting the Manager at the TelCo and when TelCo starts.
- Pre-defined email layout, besides the layouts of Agenda, Minutes, Check List, Participants list are very useful to avoid problems during the emergency.
- List of the Incident Managers and Communication Managers must be checked and updated in the occasion of a declared ICM case
- Press shared by the Communication Leading Manager should be available in English besides the national language, and with Freight specific information

- It has to be ensured that everyone can use the platform to participate in the meeting. As I understand, ÖBB could not connect these meetings.

## 6. Recommendations and Food for Thought

Display of the collected feedback by DB Netz, RFI, TRV and BDK

- Prepare joint Agenda and Minutes layouts for joint TelCos
- Check if it is leaner to have on Telco both for Operation Centres and Communication experts in order to save time.
- Check if an early warning step could be implemented in order to create awareness for the accident to possibly develop as a potential ICM case (although the consequences are not yet fully clear) and speed up the process of Coordination and Communication in case of a classified ICM case. In a first early warning email all general information like the Handbook could be shared, all following emails should be held as lean as possible in order to focus on the most important information.
- All Information has to be in English and with a special focus on Rail Freight traffic.
- Clear communication of the next steps. Possibly a finalising/ wind-up step needs to be introduced (mail or call)
- The invitation to the TelCos should be sent as a calendar invitation so that people have to accept. Thus, the Coordinator knows who read the invitation, that the IM is informed and that some representative from the IM is going to take part. I.e. it would be useful to know upfront whether the IMs of Italy and Austria decided that are not affected by the disruption and did they see their participation as necessary. Maybe we could split the corridor into north and south and categorize disruptions accordingly.
- It could be useful to develop Templates for Emails, Agenda, closing message and Minutes in order to standardize the information and speed up processes. (see ICM Handbook Rhine-Alpine)
- Feedback should be collected immediately after the case in order to make sure that all details are fully remembered.
- It should be used Videocall instead of call conference for sharing more detailed information.
- The TelCo/Videocall should be always available on line and frequently tested by IMs and CMs (e.g. monthly).
- Germany sent an e-mail about the incident to ScanMed members, which meant that the Danish ScanMed member relevant in this situation, Lars Back Johansson, had to send an e-mail to communication at the traffic control center. For future use, we have provided the German traffic control center with the officer's mailbox. It's the Danish national traffic control center that is responsible for long-term disturbances to traffic that affects neighbouring countries. Therefore, it is also important that communication procedures are in place.
- We need to ensure that no information is lost and that there are no errors in messages in order to keep safety high in the railway. In this specific situation, we send information from the traffic control center but it's also done in TAP. We might need to agree who does what.
- Check if ICM situation can be split in three arrangements: ICM ScanMed North, South and total



## 7. Evaluation and Next Steps

The Review Report was presented by C-OSS Manager Stephan Noll to the participants of the ICM Workshop in Stockholm on 30.01.2020. The Workshop members reviewed the collected feedback and discussed which recommendations should be taken into consideration to shape the ScanMed's ICM routine, processes, templates and documents.

Decisions have been taken during this Workshop (see Minutes of the Workshop) which will be incorporated in the new ICM package which is updated and finalized until the next meeting on 24./25.02.2020. After the endorsement of these new ICM documents and templates by the Management Board in March 2020, there will be an ICM simulation on 29.04.2020 to test new routine, tools and handling.